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Executive summary
Some of the world’s most powerful global agro-chemical companies are gearing up to join forces, which 
will grant them even greater control over essential food markets. Although the European Commission is 
tasked with the role of ‘competition watchdog’, its track record for the enforcement of merger rules to 
date confirms a strong pro-concentration stance. 
There is no other EU policy area in which such wide-ranging executive, judicial and legislative compe-
tences have been fused into an unelected entity: the European Commission. The result is that demo-
cratically-elected decision makers have no formal role in the overall course of the enforcement of EU 
competition rules. 
Paradoxically, whereas cartels that reduce competition in specifically agreed areas are fiercely prosecut-
ed, mergers and acquisitions that permanently eliminate all competition are stimulated. The Commission 
has legitimized its pro-concentration stance by referring to synergy effects, such as lower costs and 
thus lower prices for consumers, product innovation and the displacement of inefficient management 
structures. However, large transnational corporations have been the main beneficiaries to date, and 
smaller and less competitive companies have suffered. The Commission’s policy of consolidation of eco-
nomic power into ever-fewer transnational corporations is thus neither in the interest of consumers nor 
society at large.
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Introduction
The recently proposed mega-mergers between the 
agro-chemical giants Bayer and Monsanto (yet to be offi-
cially submitted), Dow and DuPont, and ChemChina and 
Syngenta will lead to unseen economic concentration in the 
markets for seeds and pesticides and other chemical inputs. 
These mergers will not only affect the future of biodiversity, 
wildlife and the conditions under which farmers produce 
their crops, but also the lives and food choices of billions 
of people around the world. Before these mega-mergers 
can take place, the fusing companies will need to get the 
permission of several competition authorities. At European 
Union (EU) level, the European Commission is the supra-
national competition authority in charge of allowing or 
prohibiting such mergers.
The EU has had supranational merger control rules on 
its books since 1990. Not only does the Commission have 
the power to permit or prohibit mergers above a certain 
turnover threshold, but it can also demand amendments 
to proposed deals. Judging from the Commission’s merger 
control practices over the past three decades, it is not sur-
prising that it has already approved the mergers between 
ChemChina and Syngenta, and between Dow and DuPont, 
on the condition that parts of the companies will be sold 
off.  Since 1990, the Commission has approved nine out of 
ten notified mergers without imposing any conditions, and 
has taken a strong pro-merger and thus pro-economic con-
centration stance. As former Competition Commissioner 
Neelie Kroes put it: “The merger tsunami is a good sign. It 
shows that the market itself is adapting to change, and that 
European companies are adapting to global competition. 
Healthy restructuring is taking place in many sectors… 
These processes… must be allowed to run their course 
without undue political interference.”[1]  
On the website of the European Commission we read that 
EU competition policy “is about applying rules to make sure 
businesses and companies compete fairly with each other. 
This encourages enterprise and efficiency, creates a wider 
choice for consumers and helps reduce prices and improve 
quality.” But is EU competition policy really about fair com-
petition and benefiting consumers? 
In what follows we take a critical look at EU competition 
policy and its wider consequences for the organization of 
the economy. We first outline the key regulatory elements 
and the absence of democratic accountability in the field 
of competition policy. We then trace trends in the enforce-
ment of competition rules, revealing a disturbing paradox: 
on the one hand, the Commission has aggressively pros-
ecuted cartels and flexed its muscles against mammoth 
corporations such as Microsoft, Intel and Google. On the 
other hand, very few mergers have been blocked since the 
adoption of merger rules in 1990. 
The EU ‘merger control’ system has thus facilitated large-
scale (cross-border) mergers, and has made massive eco-
nomic concentration possible. This is a major reason why 
EU competition policy is strongly supported by transna-
tional business groups such as the European Roundtable 
of Industrialists (ERT), BusinessEurope and the American 
Chamber of Commerce to the EU (AmChamEU) – the ac-
tual beneficiaries of EU competition policy.
1. EU competition policy: a bastion of 
unchecked Commission power
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union in-
cludes provisions on anti-competitive agreements (Article 
101), the abuse of dominant positions (Article 102), pub-
lic undertakings (Article 106) and state aid (Article 107). 
These competition rules have been in place ever since the 
European Economic Community came into being with 
the Treaty of Rome in 1957.[2] By targeting all sorts of 
private and public market barriers, competition rules were 
fundamental in the reconfiguration of several nationally 
fragmented markets into one giant common market. In the 
words of the Treaty, the rules were to ensure “that com-
petition in the internal market is not distorted”. However, 
the Treaty did not refer to ‘mergers’ by name, even though 
mergers can undermine competition by leading to eco-
nomic concentration. Only in 1990 did supranational 
merger control become a part of EU competition policy.
Since the early 1960s, the enforcement of the Treaty’s com-
petition rules has been the prerogative of the Commission’s 
Directorate General for Competition, and in the case of 
disputes, the European Court of Justice. The Commission 
enjoys far-reaching competences with respect to the pros-
ecution of anti-competitive agreements and the abuse 
of dominant positions. As Europe’s leading ‘competition 
watchdog’, it is empowered to impose significant economic 
sanctions on companies that abuse their dominant market 
Too Big to Control?  3
position or that enter anti-competitive agreements (such 
as cartels). In addition to prosecuting corporate conduct, 
the Commission can prohibit state aid to companies, and 
thereby overrule the industrial policies of member states. 
Moreover, since 1990, the Commission has the power to 
block mergers whenever they are considered a significant 
impediment to effective competition in the EU. 
The Commission acts as investigator, prosecutor, judge, 
jury and executioner, all in one. There is no comparable EU 
policy area where such wide-ranging executive, judicial, 
and legislative competences have been fused into an une-
lected entity. Neither the Council of the European Union 
nor the European Parliament can hold the Commission 
accountable in competition matters. The fusion between 
the three branches of the state – the legislature, executive 
and judiciary – within the Commission is supposed to 
ensure that competition rules are enforced by a politically 
independent competition authority, free from partisan in-
fluence. This means that democratically-elected decision 
makers cannot intervene in individual competition cases 
and thus have no formal say in the overall course of the 
enforcement. 
The European Parliament and the Council are involved in 
the ordinary legislative process, and thus also in the formu-
lation of legislation on how to deal with mergers and eco-
nomic concentration. However, the Commission frequently 
circumvents official legislative processes in the field of com-
petition policy by issuing quasi-legislation, for instance in the 
form of substantive notices, comfort letters, codes of conduct 
and guidelines. Such quasi-legislation does not need the ap-
proval of the Council or the European Parliament, and thus 
allows the Commission to bypass political contestation. Or 
as Competition Commission Vestager has declared: “There is 
simply no room to spare for political interference.”[3] 
At the same time, the Commission puts a great deal of ef-
fort into presenting itself as a transparent and accountable 
regulatory body that listens to societal input through public 
consultations in the form of green and white papers. The 
Commission is not however obliged to justify why it disre-
gards some voices and not others, nor does it choose to ex-
plain such decisions voluntarily. Thus, public consultations 
often merely create the illusion that a plurality of interest 
groups can exert influence on the future development of EU 
competition policy.
2. The enforcement paradox: promoting competition 
whilst facilitating economic concentration
Promoting competition
Two phases in the enforcement of EU competition rules 
can be distinguished throughout the history of European 
integration. In the first phase, lasting from the early 1960s 
until the early 1980s, the Commission’s enforcement prac-
tices were overall very lenient and a number of regulatory 
provisions were left untouched.
During this first phase, the Commission turned a blind eye 
to state aid such as subsidized loans, tax concessions, guar-
anteed procurement and financial guarantees, and export 
assistance was largely tolerated. It also did not intervene 
in the preferential treatment of state-owned companies, 
nor did it issue directives demanding the privatization of 
national monopolies, even though it could have done so on 
the basis of the Treaty of Rome. 
The Commission moreover imposed mild sanctions on so-
called cartels: agreements between competing companies 
that limited competition through fixing prices or sharing 
markets. When Europe was hit by the Great Stagflation 
Crisis in the 1970s, the Commission even permitted ‘crisis 
cartels’ in industries such as the steel, shipbuilding, chemi-
cals, man-made fibres and textiles sectors, as well as in the 
sugar industry.[4] 
More generally, the Commission took broader social and 
macroeconomic concerns – such as unemployment and 
industrial development – into consideration in the enforce-
ment of competition rules, rather than focusing solely on 
competition. Competition policy, in other words, closely 
mirrored (protectionist) industrial policy. 
In the second ‘neoliberal’ phase, stretching from the mid-
1980s until today, the focus of EU competition policy gradu-
ally narrowed.[5] Intense price competition was emphasized, 
and sophisticated econometric price modelling as a central 
reference point for determining anti-competitive conduct 
made its inroads into the Commission’s enforcement prac-
tices. The underlying rationale was, and still is, that intense 
price competition increases corporate efficiency, which al-
legedly benefits consumers through lower prices. 
From the mid-1980s onwards, the Commission targeted 
different forms of direct and indirect state aid. By further 
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specifying the conditions for state aid, the Commission 
narrowed the leeway for protectionist industrial policies at 
member state level. Moreover, the Commission endorsed the 
hitherto unused privatization directives under Article 106(3). 
Privatization became a particularly high priority when the 
Commission took over the role of guiding the previously 
centrally planned Central and Eastern European countries 
through the transition to free market capitalism in the 
1990s. Former state-owned enterprises ended up in a clear-
ance sale, which created new opportunities for corporate 
expansion. Furthermore, the Commission prosecuted car-
tels with previously unseen rigour. Particularly from 2000 
onwards, the magnitude of fines imposed on cartelists rose 
sharply (see Table 1). Cartels were newly considered to be 
the enemy of free competition. In the memorable words of 
Mario Monti, who served as Competition Commissioner 
from 1999 to 2004, cartels are “cancers on the open market 
economy”.[6] 
Table 1. EU cartel fines imposed on companies, 1990 
– 2017
Years Fines in Euros
1990 - 1994 344,825,000
1995 - 1999 344,282,550
2000 – 2004 270,963,500
2005 – 2009 7,920,497,226
2010 – 2014 7,608,375,579
2015 - February 2017 5,091,156,000
Source: European Commission cartel statistics,  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf 
The Commission has also recently imposed large fines on 
companies for having abused their dominant market posi-
tions. High profile cases concern the US giants Intel and 
Microsoft, which were fined respectively €1 and €2.2 billion, 
while Google seems to be the next high-tech company to 
face a hefty fine for abusing its dominant market position.  
To recapitulate: since the mid-1980s, the Commission has 
stepped up its efforts to promote competition in the com-
mon market by targeting cartels and abuses of dominant 
market positions, whilst prohibiting state aid and pushing 
for privatization. As will be shown in the next section, the 
Commission’s fierce pro-competition stance (on state aid 
and cartels) contrasts sharply with its lax attitude towards 
economic concentration in the form of mergers. 
Facilitating economic concentration
When the Treaty of Rome was being negotiated, a coalition 
of government and industry representatives – including 
the Council of the Federation of European Industries, es-
tablished in 1951 and encompassing the main employers’ 
associations from France, Belgium, the Netherlands and 
Germany – blocked the inclusion of merger rules. At the 
time, European companies were facing harsh competition 
from much larger and technologically more advanced US 
companies.[7] Member state governments sought to boost 
‘national champions’ in strategically important industries 
on the basis of proactive industrial policies and state aid, 
and considered it of the utmost importance that European 
companies could grow in size, create synergy effects and 
reap the benefits of economies of scale and scope produc-
tion through mergers and acquisitions. Political opposition 
to supranational merger rules that could potentially block 
economic concentration was therefore fierce.
In the absence of merger rules during the decades of post-
war European integration, the Commission promoted rath-
er than prohibited cross-border economic concentration, 
and sought to stimulate ‘Eurochampions’. This permissive 
attitude towards economic concentration did not change 
with the 1989 adoption of the merger regulation, entrusting 
the Commission with exclusive control of ‘Community-
dimension’ mergers. Companies meeting a certain com-
bined turnover threshold were required to notify their 
envisaged merger at EU level. The Commission could then 
either prohibit the merger, subject it to certain conditions 
or allow it without further ado. As parliaments and member 
state governments had no say in the enforcement of com-
petition rules, the European Court of Justice was the only 
‘checks and balances’ element in the system. 
The EU merger rules were adopted in the context of the 
broader neoliberal regulatory restructuring that started in 
the mid-1980s with the Single European Act (SEA). The 
SEA aimed to complete the Single Market by 31 December 
1992 by introducing a range of substantial and legislative 
procedural changes to the Treaty of Rome. As part of the 
reinvigorated pro-integration spirit alongside the SEA, the 
Commission proposed supranational merger control rules, 
thereby responding to the calls of industry representatives 
who were increasingly struggling with what has been 
termed a ‘multiple jurisdictional overlap’: the necessity to 
simultaneously notify planned mergers to several national 
competition authorities, each enforcing different merger 
rules, notification procedures and timetables, while requir-
ing different information and review fees. 
As several industries had sought to overcome the limited 
domestic growth opportunities by relocating or subcon-
tracting their production to areas in the world where labour 
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was cheap, docile and unregulated and corporate taxes and 
environmental standards were low, they sought to over-
come different national regulations by overriding EU level 
solutions. When the Commission announced its plan for 
adopting merger rules in its 1985 White Paper Completing 
the Internal Market, it assured business organisations like 
the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), UNICE 
(today BusinessEurope) and AmChamEU that it would 
not take the line “that bringing the big together is bad”.[8] 
Consequently, business organisations became proponents 
of a pan-European merger rule, pushing for regulation that 
would support corporate restructuring and advocating a so-
called ‘one-stop-shop’ system whereby potentially contra-
dictory merger reviews by national competition authorities 
would be eliminated.[9]
Merger control enforcement 
The track record for enforcement of the merger rules from 
1990 until today confirms the Commission’s strong pro-con-
centration stance (see Figure 1). Only 25 of the 6,493 notified 
mergers – a mere 0.4 per cent – have been blocked (calcu-
lated up to 28 February 2017). Between 2002 and 2016, the 
Commission prohibited only seven mergers. While it is pos-
sible that a range of intended mergers have been withdrawn 
or were never notified anticipating a negative ruling,[10] it is 
safe to conclude that this so-called ‘EU merger control’ has 
in fact greatly facilitated economic concentration.
The Commission has legitimized its pro-concentration 
stance by referring to synergy effects, such as lower costs 
and thus lower prices for consumers, product innovation 
and the displacement of inefficient management struc-
tures.[11] In 2007 alone, prior to the outbreak of the crisis, 
the Commission received 402 notifications, until that 
date the largest number of notified mergers in a year. The 
Commission interpreted this merger wave as a positive sig-
nal, indicating an economic upturn.[12] Its permissive stance 
echoed US practices: as a competition official remarked, the 
EU and the US competition authorities had finally “agreed 
to let even monopolists compete”.[13]
Even after the economic crisis hit, the Commission contin-
ued to see mergers as an important part of a healthy econo-
my with the argument that they would induce “much need-
ed restructuring moves in certain industries” and that EU 
merger rules should “not stand in the way of the emergence 
of European companies capable of competing on the world 
stage”.[14] The resulting power asymmetries between or-
ganized capital and labour, as well as other societal interests, 
have been of no substantial concern to the Commission.
Figure 1. Mergers notified to the European Commission, 1990-2016
Source: Calculated from European Commission merger statistics, up until 28 February 2017
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In the neoliberal era, economic concentration has increased 
massively in Europe and beyond. Between 1980 and 1999, the 
total number of mergers grew worldwide at 42 per cent per 
year.[15] In terms of aggregated value, global merger activi-
ty rose a hundredfold in this same period.[16] Throughout 
the 1990s, mergers accounted for almost 90 per cent of FDI 
flows, indicating that so-called Greenfield investments – in-
vestments in new physical production and operational facil-
ities from the ground up that create new jobs – were largely 
absent.[17]
Financial players and financial 
gains in the takeover market
Alongside the deregulation of financial markets and the 
growing importance of stock market capitalisation as a 
means for corporate finance, corporations were bought and 
sold as if they were random commodities. Hostile takeovers 
through the acquisition of a majority of shares without the 
mutual consent of executive directors became more fre-
quent. Only a third of transactions were full mergers.[18] 
The presence of a growing number of cash-rich lenders, 
hedge funds, private equity funds and other investors led 
to a situation in which mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 
were increasingly undertaken for the purpose of making 
short-term gains from speculative arbitrages rather than as 
productive investments. This was facilitated through the 
availability of a whole range of new financial products for 
lending, leasing, hedging and stripping facilitated lever-
aged buyouts, asset stripping, equity swaps and predatory 
bidding for shares. Mergers were further stimulated by 
the presence of activist financial players in M&As, known 
as ‘locusts’ or ‘asset-strippers’ in reference to their often 
voracious behaviour in breaking up company structures. 
As hostile takeovers generally provided the bidder with a 
free hand in the company reorganisation, hostile takeovers 
boosted share prices more than friendly ones.
At the turn of the new millennium, there were an estimated 
31,019 mergers worldwide, with an aggregate volume of US$ 
3.5 trillion (compared to US$ 0.5 trillion in the early 1990s).
[19] Traditionally, merger waves involved bigger corpora-
tions eating smaller ones. The 2000 merger wave however 
consisted of ‘mega-mergers’ involving large companies. 
After the peak in 2000 and the subsequent bursting of the 
‘dot-com bubble’, the pace of merger activity slowed down 
slightly, but soon accelerated again to once more reach un-
precedented heights. 
In the run-up to the 2007-2008 financial crisis, new records 
were set for both the number and the size of corporate 
aggregate turnover. In 2006, eight of the ten largest global 
mergers in history were concluded, if measured in terms 
of the aggregated volume of the companies involved, while 
the sheer number of mergers also set new records.[20] The 
involvement of hedge funds and private equity funds in 
merger transactions increased from 3 per cent in 2000 to 19 
per cent in 2006.[21] 
In the three years between 2008 and 2011, financial invest-
ment companies were responsible for up to 20 per cent of 
the 900 transactions that were notified to the Commission.
[22] Merger activity also involved financial players them-
selves, leading to the financial behemoths that – in the 
course of the crisis – eventually came to be considered ‘too-
big-to-fail’. Even when the crisis hit in 2007, M&As in the 
financial sector continued.[23] 
Unbridled corporate enmeshment
The global corporate restructuring processes of the past 
decades resulted in massive economic concentration, 
which can be seen from the fact that in many sectors only a 
small number of companies have high global market shares 
(see Table 2). Economic concentration through merg-
ers are however only the tip of the iceberg. Commercial 
Table 2. Industrial concentration among system-integrator corporations, 2006-09
 Number of corporations Global market share
Large commercial aircraft 2 100
Automobiles 10 77
Fixed-line telecoms infrastructure 5 83
Mobile telecoms infrastructure 3 77
Pharmaceuticals 10 69
Construction equipment 4 44
Agricultural equipment 3 69
Cigarettes 4 75
Source: adapted from Nolan and Zhang 2010
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inter-company agreements in the form of strategic allianc-
es, partnerships, joint ventures and business consortia have 
also proliferated. Although boundaries are often blurred, 
such forms of corporate enmeshment are much more com-
mon practice than mergers.[24]
The same dynamic of corporate concentration can be ob-
served in the European seed market. For example, according 
to a study commissioned by the Greens/EFA Group in the 
European Parliament 45 per cent of the UK’s wheat market 
has been captured by a single company, while five compa-
nies control 95 per cent of the EU vegetable seed market. 
The vitally important EU maize seed sector is dominated 
by five companies with collective market shares amounting 
to over half of the total of 4975 maize varieties registered 
in the European Common Catalogue. To further break it 
down: the maize varieties of DuPont Pioneer encompass 
12.2 per cent, Syngenta 11.5 per cent, Limagrain 9.7 per cent, 
Monsanto 8.95 per cent, and KWS 8.9 per cent of the total 
market share.[25]
The graph below gives an overview of the global concentra-
tion in the seeds and pesticide sectors.
This vast global economic concentration has been made 
possible by the merger-friendly approach of the European 
Commission, as well as other competition authorities. 
There is a paradox at the heart of contemporary competi-
tion rule enforcement: whereas cartels are fiercely prosecut-
ed, mergers and acquisitions are considered unproblematic 
and even desirable. As correctly pointed out by one scholar, 
a cartel between two companies temporarily reduces com-
petition between them in specifically agreed areas, whereas 
a merger between two companies permanently eliminates 
all competition between them.[26] 
This does not however imply that there is no competition 
as a result of economic concentration. Oligopolistic mar-
kets can be characterized by fierce price competition. At the 
same time, economic concentration can also lead to tacit 
collusion whereby companies abstain from competing with 
one another without explicitly forming a cartel agreement. 
Figure 2. Buying up the competition
Global concentration of the biggest agrochemical companies. Basis 2014 revenues (in billion $US)
This graph does not yet incorporate the fact that the European Commission gave its stamp of approval in early 2017 to the Syngenta/ChemChina, 
and Dow/DuPont mergers, on the condition that some parts of the companies had to be sold off. The bottom graph shows that for the biggest 
four companies, their seed and pesticide sales constitute only a minor part of their total market power.
Source: Konzernatlas/Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung
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3. EU competition policy: in whose interest?
Transnational corporations seeking to further strength-
en their global market positions and gain market access 
through mergers have been the main beneficiaries of the 
economic concentration facilitated by the Commission. 
It is thus not surprising that transnational and thus large 
businesses overall strongly support EU competition policy 
and that less competitive and smaller companies have been 
losing out. Attempts to form a counterweight through in-
ter-company agreements come with the risk of cartel pros-
ecution, and state subsidies are by and large considered as 
competition distorting and thus prohibited in the current 
climate of competition rule enforcement. EU competition 
rules function as a fictitious equaliser: they standardize 
corporations irrespective of their size and economic power 
into something they are not, namely equal market players.
The Commission’s enforcement practices have occasion-
ally led to political contestation, most notably from the 
social forces that are on the losing side. These include 
organised labour and governments concerned about the 
economic survival of less competitive domestic companies 
and industries. For instance, the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC), the umbrella organization of na-
tional trade unions representing the interests of workers at 
the institutional level of the EU, demanded that mergers 
should also be assessed with regard to their effects on em-
ployment levels, while ensuring that employees’ views are 
also heard. These demands have however consistently been 
ignored by the Commission.
The European Project has been and continues to be heavily 
influenced by corporate interests. The influence of business 
however must be differentiated, as not all businesses have 
corresponding interests. Moreover, the Commission is not 
a neutral transmission belt that is equally accessible to all 
groups in society. 
At the same time, the Commission has not simply been 
‘captured’ by the interests of big business. After all, the 
Commission enforces EU competition rules relatively 
autonomously, removed not only from parliaments and 
governments, but also from interest groups. The influence 
of business is not limited to ‘who gets to lobby whom, and 
how often’. Rather, business interests are much more in-
timately and structurally intertwined with the project of 
European integration. 
The EU and its complex setup of institutions with the 
Commission at its core has an built-in structural bias that 
serves to advance (or obstruct) particular business interests.
[27] This ‘strategic selectivity’ means that the Commission, 
and also other EU institutions like the European Parliament 
and the European Courts, reflects the consolidation of much 
wider societal power asymmetries over time. With the rise 
of neoliberalism in Europe and elsewhere, the balance of 
power has shifted in favour of transnational business and 
particularly the financial sector, at the expense of smaller 
and nationally-oriented businesses and labour.
So, what about consumers? The Commission claims to 
act on behalf of consumers who will supposedly directly 
benefit from competition in the form of lower prices and 
better quality products. The effects of EU competition 
policy on consumers are however far from unambiguous. 
While intensified competition may indeed lead to lower 
prices, it should not be forgotten that consumers need 
employment before they can consume. Workers often pay 
the price of intensified competition as it exerts direct pres-
sure on “the sphere of production, and particularly labour 
to deliver higher profitability, be it by higher productivity, 
longer working days or lower wages”.[28] Competition in 
many cases has considerable downsides. The consolidation 
of economic power into ever-fewer transnational corpora-
tions is thus not in the interest of consumers or society at 
large.
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